An important opportunity may exist to explore reciprocal reductions in Russian and NATO military forces in Eastern Europe as part of a broader settlement that strengthens European security and provides additional incentives for peace.
During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba while the United States secretly agreed to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Although today’s circumstances differ, the principle of reciprocal security concessions remains relevant.
This approach has historical precedents. The 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty established verifiable limitations on major conventional weapons. The 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act addressed restraint, transparency and avoidance of destabilizing force concentrations. More recently, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (2022) examined reciprocal restrictions in a new European security order, while a July 2026 Quincy Institute policy brief explored mutual military reductions and related security arrangements.
We suggest exploring:
Phased, reciprocal reductions in designated Russian and NATO conventional force deployments.
Negotiated limitations on Russian deployments in Belarus and Kaliningrad, paired with mutually acceptable NATO measures.
Restrictions on selected offensive missile systems and measures to reduce risks of surprise attack.
Effective verification, transparency and safeguards against renewed aggression.
Credible security arrangements for Ukraine, without making immediate NATO membership a necessary precondition.
Any arrangement would require the consent of Ukraine and the NATO states directly affected, with carefully sequenced and verifiable obligations. Such measures could complement the previously proposed International Advisory Board for European Children and Families.
While reciprocal arms control is not a new idea, explicitly incorporating it into a comprehensive Ukraine peace settlement, drawing on the diplomatic lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis, might provide a useful additional path to compromise.
Selected references:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (2022)
Quincy Institute (July 2026)
NATO–Russia Founding Act (1997)